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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes whether regulating “hot spots” of toxic air pollution by increasing the spatial 
resolution of regulation could address environmental justice (EJ) concerns.  To examine this 
question, this paper develops a decision model of a regulator choosing emission controls within a 
net cost minimizing framework.  An empirical application of the model using air toxic emission 
data for Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties in Florida estimates the emission standards and 
spatial distribution of risks at a coarse and a finer spatial resolutions.  Implications for EJ are 
analyzed by combining the simulated spatial risk distributions at the two resolutions with the 
demographic data.  Results indicate that different measures of EJ point to different conclusions 
regarding the question of whether finer resolution regulation alleviates EJ concerns.  The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the implications for EJ policy. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 Environmental justice (EJ) has been one of the central themes of environmental policy 
debate in the United States over the past decade.  The evidence of disproportionate distribution 
of environmental risks and grassroots political activism in a number of communities across the 
country led to several policy initiatives to address EJ, including an executive order in 1992 
(Brulle and Pellow, 2006).   In this paper, we present an ex ante analysis of a specific policy 
approach primarily aimed at addressing the EJ concerns arising from emissions of air toxics.1 
 The policy approach studied here involves regulation at the local or community scale by 
characterizing air toxics risks at fine spatial resolutions.  Our primary research question is: does 
spatially finely resolved regulation of toxic air pollutants lead to a more equitable distribution of 
risks?  To address this question, we first develop a decision model of a net cost minimizing 
regulator and analyze the implications of finer resolution regulation to emission standards.  We 
then apply the model to air toxics data in two counties to simulate how emission standards, 
spatial distribution of risks, and measures of EJ could change as regulation changes from a 
coarse spatial resolution to a finer resolution.  We show that the evidence of policy effectiveness 
in addressing EJ concerns depends on the measure of EJ employed.  Our analysis also suggests 
that EJ policies, in order to be effective, require a clear articulation of the goals of EJ and explicit 
incorporation of those goals into the decision making process of agencies.  This study contributes 
to the growing literature on the analysis of EJ policy effectiveness. 
                                                 
1 Air toxics are one class of air pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act.  These include pollutants such as 
benzene, formaldehyde, and heavy metals. 
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This paper is organized as follows.  The next sub-section reviews previous research on 
the evaluation of EJ policies.  Section 2 presents some background on the policy approach our 
paper analyzes.  In Section 3, we formulate our research question and describe the methodology 
used to test our research question.  Sections 4, 5, and 6, respectively, present our decision model, 
empirical analyses, and results.  The paper concludes in Section 7 with a brief discussion of the 
implications of our study for EJ policy. 
1.1 Previous Research 
 Some of the early studies on the analysis of EJ policy have focused on evaluating the 
impact of the EJ executive order (EJEO) 12898 on agency rule making. Bass (1998) utilized two 
case studies of EJ assessments under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to 
recommend “questions” that the federal agencies should address in assessing the EJ implication 
of NEPA implementation.  The U.S. Government Accounting Office, in its recent reports, 
analyzed three air quality rules promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and found that EPA is lacking in clear guidance and tools to effectively incorporate EJEO 
in its rulemaking (GAO, July, 2005).  A more recent study analyzed the Superfund site listing 
before and after the EJEO and concluded that the implementation of EJEO did not address the 
inequity in the listing of Superfund sites (O’Neil, 2007).  For example, for Superfund sites 
discovered after the EJEO, ceteris paribus, the probability of listing in a minority or poor 
community is lower, compared to the sites discovered before the EJEO. 
 The other prominent federal program aimed at addressing EJ has been the EJ Small 
Grants (EJSG) Program, the objective of which is to encourage collaborative local solutions to 
environmental problems in EJ communities.  This program funds specific non-profit 
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organizations, city, township or county governments, and Native American tribal governments 
involved in working with EJ communities.2  A spatial analysis of this program showed that funds 
under this program might not be reaching the intended communities and in several counties that 
received these grants, TRI emissions have actually increased (Vajjhala, 2007).   Although TRI 
emissions represent an imperfect measure of the environmental outcomes intended under the 
program, this analysis suggests a lack of clarity in the criteria set for funding under the program. 
 In addition to federal policies, several states adopt and implement EJ policies, either on 
their own or by federal mandates (see Ringquist and Clark, 1999 for a review of state EJ 
policies).  A comprehensive study of state EJ policy adoption tested whether EJ policy at state 
level represents a protective regulatory policy or a redistributive policy and found that state EJ 
policies share the characteristics of both policies (Ringquist and Clark, 2002).  One of the several 
findings of this study is that “environmental justice exists in the policy making arena as a shadow 
rather than as an issue of substance and immediacy” (p: 380).  The authors attribute this to the 
lack of consensus on part of the EJ activist community on such basic issues as the nature of EJ 
problem and potential solutions to the problem. 
 Finally, an important component of EJ policy is providing opportunities and avenues for 
the involvement of EJ communities in the decision making process.  A growing trend in this area 
is the community-based participatory research, which emphasizes “involving community 
members in identifying issues in need of investigation, collaborating in the conduct of the 
research, and translating research-based findings into action, including advocacy for policy level 
change” (Petersen et al., 2006, p: 339).  Case study evaluation of some of these efforts, 
                                                 
2 EPA Factsheet available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/ej/factsheets/fact-sheet-ej-
small-grants-4-08.pdf 
6 
 
especially in California, suggests significant success in the ability of these community-academic 
partnerships to affect policy change that benefits public health (Petersen et al., 2006; Minkler et 
al., 2008).  The drawback of these case study evaluations is the difficulty in separating the effect 
of the partnerships from other contextual factors that contribute to the policy change. 
Overall, our review suggests that much of the emphasis in the literature has been on the 
“process” aspects of the EJ policy implementation (e.g., whether the EJ intervention led to a 
policy change and whether the adopted EJ policies are protective or redistributive in nature).  
Few studies analyze particular EJ policies from the perspective of the environmental outcomes to 
the targeted EJ groups.  Further, it appears that the effectiveness of EJ policies is impeded by a 
lack of clarity and agreement on fundamental issues, including the nature of the EJ problem and 
metrics to assess “justice” or “equity” or “disproportionate impact” (Noonan, 2008).  This paper 
addresses these issues and contributes to the EJ policy literature by analyzing, ex ante, the EJ 
implications of a specific policy: regulation of air toxics hot spots at fine spatial resolutions. 
 
2.0 Policy Background 
 The increasing use of emissions trading programs in U.S. air pollution policy has brought 
air pollution “hot spots” 3 – locations with unacceptably high pollutant concentrations – into 
focus in recent policy debates.  The critics of the trading programs raise the concern that such a 
policy would result in hot spots near those sources for which it is cheaper to buy permits than 
abate emissions (e.g., Heinzerling and Steinzor, 2004).  Concern about hot spots has been a  
                                                 
3 The National Academies study on future air quality management in the United States defined hot spots as “locales 
where pollutant concentrations are substantially higher than concentrations indicated by ambient outdoor monitors 
located in adjacent or surrounding areas (NRC, 2004, p:274).” 
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driving force of opposition, for example, to EPA’s mercury rule (Graham, 2007) and California’s 
greenhouse emissions regulation (Hanemann, 2008).  In addition to concerns related to trading 
programs, there is also growing evidence of hot spots near roadways due to vehicular air 
pollution. Zhu et al., (2002), for example, show that the concentration of ultrafine particles 
within 100m of a roadway could be 25 times higher than concentrations beyond 300m.  
Addressing hot spots is one of the main challenges facing air quality management in the United 
States (NRC, 2004). 
2.1 Hot Spots and Air Toxics 
 Hot spots with regards to air toxics have been a particular concern  for at least three 
reasons.  First, air toxics emissions from a large number of small sources such as dry cleaners 
and gas stations have the potential to create high localized concentration of emissions in densely 
populated areas (EPA, 2006a).  Second, the sparse ambient monitoring network4 for air toxics is 
unlikely to capture local variations in pollutant concentrations, especially the concentrations 
close to the emitting sources.  Finally, evidence suggests that some population groups (low-
income and minority) may be disproportionately subjected to higher risks from air toxics (e.g., 
see Morello-Frosch et al., 2001; Dolinoy and Miranda, 2004; Apelberg et al., 2005).  
2.2 Hot Spots Regulation at Fine Spatial Resolutions 
 Reduction of risks from hot spots has been an important component of EPA’s overall air 
toxics strategy.  The National Air Toxics Program or “Urban Air Toxics Strategy” (EPA, 2000) 
intended to “characterize exposure and risk distributions….”  in “geographic ’hot spots’…” (p: 
38712) to achieve the goal of addressing disproportionate impacts of air toxics.  Similarly, risk 
                                                 
4 The current national monitoring network for air toxics, called the National Air Toxics Trends Station network, has 
only 22 monitors across the country and monitors 18 toxic air pollutants (E.P.A, 2004), mainly in large urban areas. 
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reduction in hot spots is a “near-source” and “community/neighborhood” goal of EPA’s 
Workplan for the National Air Toxics Program and Integrated Air Toxics State/Local/Tribal 
Program Structure (EPA, 2001). 
 One approach to deal with hot spots has been to encourage local/community-scale 
regulation of air toxics at fine spatial resolutions.  The rationale behind this approach is that 
monitoring networks and modeling studies at the national scale (e.g., the National Air Toxics 
Assessment, which estimates risks at census tract resolution) do not provide adequate spatial 
resolution to regulate locations of high air toxics concentrations (i.e., hot spots) (e.g., see 
Dolinoy and Miranda, 2004).  Thus, in its latest national air toxics monitoring strategy, instead of 
expanding the sparse national air toxics monitoring network, EPA decided to use 60% of its 
monitoring budget to fund community-scale air toxics efforts (EPA, 2004a).  These projects 
typically involve extensive ambient monitoring or modeling studies to characterize air toxics 
risks at very fine spatial resolutions.  Currently, EPA is supporting projects in about 30 
communities across the country, under its community-based air toxics projects program.5 
 Consistent with this approach, EPA has also been developing tools and guidance to 
model air toxics risks at finely resolved spatial units.  An example of this is the recently 
developed integrated risk assessment tool, the Regional Air Impact Modeling Initiative (RAIMI) 
(EPA, 2006b).  RAIMI is a GIS-based tool that can be used to estimate cancer and non-cancer 
risks from multiple air toxics emitted from multiple sources at a community resolution.  EPA has 
also published a detailed guidance document for conducting community-scale risk assessments 
as part of its Air Toxics Risk Assessment Reference Library series (EPA, 2006a). 
                                                 
5 http://www.epa.gov/air/toxicair/community/basic.html.  Last accessed on July 8, 2009. 
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 An example of this policy approach is the Strategic Toxic Air Reduction (STAR) 
program of The Louisville Metro Air Pollution Control District Board.6  Based on extensive 
local monitoring and modeling studies, this program identified 37 stationary source air toxics 
that pose or may pose risks above a specified health risk goal; nearly 170 facilities are subject to 
regulation under this program.  These facilities must conduct risk assessments to estimate cancer 
and non-cancer risks posed by their emissions and submit an emission reduction plan to reduce 
the risks below the health risk goal (Williams, 2007).  The U.S. EPA provided financial and 
technical assistance to design the STAR program. 
 
3.0 Research Question and Methodology 
 As the discussion above illustrates, regulation at finely resolved spatial units is emerging 
as one of the key approaches to addressing air toxics hot spots.  To elucidate the implications 
thereof, this paper asks: what effects will regulating air toxics at finely resolved spatial units 
have on the spatial distribution of risks and on environmental justice? 
 The initial steps of our analysis strategy involve simulating spatial distribution of air 
toxics risks under regulation at different spatial resolutions.  We then assess if and how measures 
of EJ change as the spatial resolution of regulation increases.  The following outlines the 
methodology we adopt to address our research question: 
• We first develop a model of an optimizing decision maker within the context of air toxics 
regulation, based on previous research and the decision processes described by EPA and state 
environmental agencies. 
                                                 
6 http://www.louisvilleky.gov/APCD/STAR/.  Last accessed on October 16, 2009. 
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• We then apply this decision model to analyze stationary sources emitting air toxics in 
Escambia and Santa Rosa counties in Florida.  The empirical analysis includes, estimation of: 
(i) the emission standards a regulator would set and (ii) the resulting spatial distribution of 
risks under two spatial resolutions of regulation: the census tract and a finer census block 
resolution.  This simulates the risk distribution that would result from a policy aimed at 
addressing hot spots (i.e., regulation at finer resolution). 
• Lastly, we overlay the spatial distributions of risk estimated at each resolution (in the 
previous step) on to the demographic data in our study area to analyze the EJ implications of 
spatially finely resolved regulation.  We use three different measures of EJ, explained in the 
later sections. 
 
4.0 A Model of Air Toxics Decision Making 
 The predominant policy tool employed in the management of air toxics in the U.S. is 
emission standards, which either limit the emissions to a specified level or specify the 
technology that the regulated entities should employ to control emissions.  In order to develop 
our decision making model, we review the relevant federal and state level regulations.    
 A key element of consideration in the risk-based regulation of air toxics is the concept of 
maximum individual risk (MIR).  MIR is the lifetime upper-bound risk to which the maximally 
exposed individual would be exposed.  In 1987, in its judgment in the Vinyl Chloride case, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia directed EPA to consider costs of air toxics 
regulation only after ensuring an acceptable MIR.  Since then, MIR has been a constraint that 
EPA has to meet in its decisions on setting emission standards for air toxics.7 
                                                 
7 van Houtven and Cropper (1996) analyzed EPA’s air toxics decisions under the Clean Air Act of 1970 and found 
that EPA considered both the costs and benefits of regulation until the verdict on the Vinyl Chloride case; after the 
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 In its current residual risk regulations, 8 EPA adopts a two-step decision process, which is 
consistent with the direction of the court in the Vinyl Chloride case.  The first step involves 
determining the acceptable MIR.  The second step sets emission standards, taking into account 
other factors including the costs of compliance, technological feasibility, and population risks, 
but only after ensuring that the MIR will not exceed the acceptable level determined in the first 
step (EPA, 1999b).  
 A related regulation at the state level is the Air Toxics “Hot spots” Information and 
Assessment Act enacted by the California Air Resources Board in 1987.  This act requires that 
the facilities that cause “significant” health risks conduct health risk assessments and inform the 
affected public of those risks.  “Significant” health risks are those risks that exceed the threshold 
risk levels set by the concerned Air Pollution Control Districts (APCD).  This threshold risk is 
similar to MIR under the federal residual risk regulation.  Facilities that exceed the threshold risk 
must submit a “risk audit and reduction plan” for APCD’s approval, in order to bring the risks 
down to the threshold value. 
 Consistent with these decision processes and following the previous models of agency 
decision making in the literature,9 the regulator in our decision model chooses emission 
standards to minimize net costs, subject to the constraint that the MIR does not exceed a 
threshold level.  The MIR, however, is determined as the maximum risk estimated based on a 
fixed number of locations in space (for example, ambient air monitoring network or the receptor 
network of an air quality model).  Hence, we model the MIR constraint as follows: no spatial 
location over which risks are regulated should have a risk exceeding the threshold value. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Vinyl Chloride decision, however, EPA did not consider costs in regulating air toxics, unless the estimated MIR was 
below 1 in 10,000. 
8 Under the residual risk rules, EPA is required to assess the risks that remain after the implementation of technology 
standards and set additional standards, if required. 
9 Such previous studies include analysis of pesticide regulations (Cropper et al., 1992), Superfund clean-up decisions 
(Gupta et al., 1992), and state adoptions of strict liability programs (Alberini and Austin, 1999).  
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4.1 Decision Problem Set-up 
 Suppose there are I sources (i =1,2,…,I), each emitting J toxic air pollutants 
(j = 1,2,3,….,J).  First, we assume that the regulator cares about only two types of costs: private 
costs of compliance for the polluting sources and the health costs of residual risk.  We further 
assume for simplicity that our regulator weighs these two costs equally.  For any source i 
reducing its emissions of pollutant j from the initial level of Qbij to Qij, and given MCij (assumed 
to be strictly convex and increasing) as the marginal cost function for that pollutant and source, 
the private abatement cost (or compliance costs) takes the form: 
 
ij
b
ij
QI J
p ij ij ij
i=1 j=1 Q
C MC (Q ) dQ= ∑∑ ∫     (1) 
    0p ijC Q∂ ∂ <       (2) 
 The second type of costs our regulator is concerned about is the population health costs.  
We assume here that our regulator quantifies only the health costs associated with cancer risks 
and that the cancer risks are additive across different toxic pollutants.  To develop an expression 
for these health costs, we begin with the individual cancer risk, 10 rm, defined as: 
1 1
  
I J
m ij ijm j
i j
r Q uβ
= =
= ∑∑  for all individuals m = 1,2,3,…, M  (3) 
Where, 
ijQ  Emission rate (gram/second) of pollutant j from i th source 
                                                 
10 Cancer risk is expressed as probability.  For example, if the cancer risk is n in a million, then it is expected that 
there will be ‘n’ additional cases of cancer when a million people are exposed to that level of risk. 
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ijmβ  Exposure concentration, in [( 3/g mµ )/(g/s)], an individual m is exposed to due to a 
unit emission rate (1 g/s) of pollutant j from source i = f (meteorology, emission and 
site characteristics, location of m with respect to the source, activity patterns of 
individuals, etc.,) 
ju  Unit Risk Factor for j th pollutant, (
3/g mµ )-1, which represents the probability of 
cancer due to continuous exposure for 70 years to 1 3/g mµ  of pollutant j 
 For M individuals (indexed m =1,2,…,M) exposed, the total population risk (i.e., the total 
number of expected additional cancer cases) is merely the sum of all the individual risks.  
Assuming that the value of statistical life (VSL) is constant across all individuals, the population 
health costs could be estimated simply as the product of the total number of expected additional 
cancer cases and the VSL (V).11  Thus, the health costs associated with cancer are given as: 
     
1
M
h m
m
C r V
=
= ∑      (4) 
    0h ijC Q∂ ∂ >      (5) 
 The MIR constraint requires that the maximum cancer risk not exceed the threshold value 
of r.  Let K be spatial resolution at which risks are regulated.  Here K represents the number of 
locations, within a geographic area of interest, over which risks are regulated.  The MIR 
constraint for regulating risks at spatial resolution K can be expressed as: 
  
1 1
  1,2,3,….,
I J
ij ijk j
i j
Q u r k Kβ
= =
≤ ∀ =∑∑    (6) 
                                                 
11 This assumes that incidence of cancer results in mortality and that VSL is constant across additional cancer cases. 
Because V enters as a scalar, it implies that there is no heterogeneity across individuals in their willingness to pay to 
reduce the risk of death.  
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where ijkβ  is the exposure concentration due to unit emissions at any given spatial location k. 
 K is a variable of interest for the research question addressed here.  A finer spatial 
resolution of regulation would then mean an increase in the number of receptor locations over 
which risks are regulated.  In other words, K is increasing with spatial resolution.12  Regulating 
over census tracts instead of counties, for example, implies increasing K. 
 The decision maker’s objective function is thus: 
( )
1 1 1 1 1
.
ij
ij b
ij
QI J I J M
ij ij ij ij ijm jQ i j i j mQ
Min MC Q dQ Q u Vβ
= = = = =
              
+∑∑ ∑∑∑∫   (7) 
subject to the constraints in equation (6) and the non-negative emissions constraints: 
0≥ijQ  
In the next section, we apply this decision model13 to air toxics data of two counties, 
Escambia and Santa Rosa in Florida, to first estimate the emission standards a regulator would 
choose under a coarse resolution (K) and a finer resolution ( K ′>K).  The emission standards 
under the two resolutions of regulation will then be used to estimate the resulting spatial 
distribution of risks at each resolution.  Finally, we combine these risk estimates with 
demographic data to analyze the EJ implications of regulating at finer spatial resolutions. 
 
                                                 
12 Our conception of finer resolution here is simply an increase in the number of spatial locations over which risks 
are regulated.  The implicit assumption is that the location of new receptors at the finer resolution is arbitrarily 
determined, which appears to be the case in the real world (Su et al., 2007). 
13 The full analytical solution for the model is available from the authors.  The basic result is that the optimal 
emission standards at finer regulation could be stricter, laxer, or unchanged relative to the emission standards at 
coarse regulation. The direction of change depends on (i) whether or not the finer resolution reveals new hot spots 
that are not revealed at coarse resolutions and (ii) how much a source/pollutant contributes to the risk at those new 
hot spots.  The full solution is not included here due to space constraints. 
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5.0 Empirical Analysis 
 Our study area consists of two counties in Northwest Florida: Escambia and Santa Rosa.  
This region has a history of problems related to toxic pollutants and environmental justice.  One 
of the most publicized problems has been the case of “Mount Dioxin,” a Superfund site of 
Escambia Treating Company.  The dioxin contamination from this site prompted grassroots level 
action and led to relocation of people living near the site (see Bullard and Johnson, 2000).  More 
recent concerns relate to the quantities of toxics emissions.  According to the toxic release 
inventory data of 2005, Escambia county was ranked top and Santa Rosa was ranked 9th in 
Florida in terms of total tons of toxics released into various media.  Responding to public 
concerns related to environmental impacts, the US Congress sponsored the Partnership for 
Environmental Research and Community Health (PERCH) to conduct a series of environmental 
health studies, including an assessment of air toxics risks in the region (UWF, 2011). 
 According to the National Toxics Inventory (NTI) of 1999, our study area had 94 air 
toxics emission sources distributed across 43 facilities, including manufacturing plants, utilities, 
and waste landfills, and emitting 78 different air toxics.  The sources include “major” 14 sources 
as well as “area”15 sources.  Many of these sources are currently regulated under the Maximum 
Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standards developed by the federal EPA under the 
CAA.  Florida, to the best of our knowledge, does not have a separate state program that 
regulates the sources of air toxics.  Florida department of environmental protection, however, 
                                                 
14 A “major” source is one that emits more than 10 tons per year (TPY) of any one of the regulated air toxics or 
more than 25 TPY of a combination of air toxics. 
15 “Area” sources emit quantities below the thresholds specified for “major” sources. 
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issues operating permits in accordance with the federal regulations and enforces compliance with 
the permits. 
 We use two criteria to select a subset of the 94 sources for our analysis:  (1) the source is 
categorized as a “major” source  and (2) the source emits at least one toxic air pollutant for which 
inhalation cancer risk can be quantified (because our model assumes quantification of only 
cancer risks).  Based on these criteria, our final sample includes 15 sources from seven facilities, 
which emit six different air toxics.16  
 The empirical analysis uses three nested spatial resolutions: census tract, census block 
group, and census block.17  The census tract (“tract” from hereon) is the biggest spatial unit and 
is composed of several census block groups (“block group” from hereon) while the census block 
(“block” from hereon) is the finest spatial unit with a number of blocks forming a block group. 
 Furthermore, in the empirical analysis, because it is not possible to estimate risks at the 
individual level, we apply the risk estimated at the geographical centroid of a census unit to all 
the individuals within that census unit.  Finally, consistent with the theoretical decision model, in 
our empirical analysis, finer resolution is assumed to include all those locations over which risks 
would be regulated at the coarse resolution in addition to the new receptors.  Thus, for example, 
the receptors for regulation at the block group resolution include not only the centroids of all the 
block groups but also that of all the census tracts. General Algebraic Modeling System 
(www.gams.com) version 22.3 is used to solve the optimization model. 
5.1 Data 
                                                 
16 We dropped one facility that met our criteria from the final sample because no abatement cost information was 
available. 
17 The choice of census unit to characterize spatial resolution is one of convenience; with the advent of advanced 
remote sensing technologies to characterize air pollution, it is perhaps possible to regulate at much finer resolutions 
than those we choose here. 
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5.1.1 Marginal Cost (MC) Functions 
 We estimate marginal MC functions using an engineering cost approach, which is a 
common method in the literature (e.g., Kilmont et al., 2000; EPA, 2003; Karvosenoja and 
Johansson, 2003; Rousseau and Proost, 2005).  Ideally, the MC functions should be derived for 
each source based on the data specific to the source.  In reality, however, such information is 
rarely available, if ever, especially for air toxics.   Thus in our case, we make some assumptions 
to make sense of the little that data are available.  Specifically, we assume that each of the 
sources in our analysis represents a “typical” or “average” firm in that source category.  We rely 
on EPA’s abatement costs estimates under its technology-based MACT standards.  EPA is 
required to conduct Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIA) to assess the costs and benefits of its 
costly regulations.  In case of MACT standards, the EPA assessed the costs of a range of 
available abatement technologies for each regulated source category.  To estimate the cost 
functions for our empirical analysis, we first identify the MACT standards relevant to the air 
toxics sources in our sample.  We then use the air permit documents available from the Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection to match our sources with the corresponding MACT 
standard. 
 After identifying the relevant MACT for each source, we collect, from the relevant RIAs, 
the information on the emission control options including the range of control technology 
options available, the emission reductions associated with each technology option, and the 
annual costs of implementing the technology.18  The annual costs include estimated annualized 
capital costs as well as operational costs.  Because these studies were carried out in different 
                                                 
18 This data on abatement technology options, removal efficiencies, and annual costs for each source are available 
from the authors on request. 
18 
 
years, we convert all costs into 1999$.  Typically, the RIAs report total compliance cost 
estimates aggregated at the level of the source category.  The estimates, however, report the 
number of firms on which these aggregate estimates are based.  Thus, for an “average” firm, the 
estimated costs could be calculated as the total sector-wise annual costs divided by the number of 
firms.  Based on our assumption that the source in our analysis represents an “average” source in 
that category, we use the cost estimates generated in the previous step for our empirical analysis 
 In this analysis, in order to be consistent with the assumptions of our decision model (i.e., 
strictly convex and increasing MC functions), we fit our cost estimates to an exponential 
functional form.  Another advantage of an exponential form for our analysis is that this 
functional form restricts the estimated annual costs to positive values.  This is also consistent 
with previous studies, which assumed either a quadratic form (Hartman et al., 1997) or an 
exponential function (Mariam and Barre, 1996). 
  ij ij
b Q
ij ijC a e=    (8) 
Annual costs of abatement for pollutant from source ($)
Emission levels of pollutant from source (Ton/Year)
, Parameters to be estimated
ij
ij
ij ij
C j i
Q j i
a b
=
=
=
 
 The cost function is fitted using non-linear least squares regressions with the annual costs 
as the dependent variable and emission level (TPY) as the independent variable.  The estimated 
cost parameters for various sources are given in Table 1.  The table also shows the standard 
errors for the coefficient estimates.  Because the data for some sources had only two abatement 
technology options, the standard errors could not be estimated. 
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[TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
5.1.2 Exposure Concentrations ( ijmβ ) 
 Application of the decision model to simulate the optimal emission standards a regulator 
would set requires estimation of exposure concentrations at the centroids of various census units.  
This analysis estimates the annual average ambient air toxics concentrations using the version 3 
of the Industrial Source Complex Short Term (ISCST3)19 air dispersion model, integrated within 
RAIMI, the integrated risk assessment tool developed by EPA.  RAIMI uses a geographical 
information system (GIS) interface.  The GIS data required for RAIMI include (i) land use and 
land cover maps, which we obtained from Florida Geographic Data Library, (ii) digital elevation 
maps, which we collected from the United States Geological Survey, and (iii) aerial photographs 
of the two county region, downloaded from Terra Server (http://terraserver.microsoft.com).   
 The ISCST model also requires hourly upper air and surface meteorological data.  We 
use EPA’s Meteorological Preprocessor for Regulatory Models to process the raw 
meteorological data collected at the Pensacola Airport for the years 1986 to 1990.  Although the 
theoretical model requires that we estimate the exposure concentrations, we use the ambient air 
toxics concentrations as surrogates for exposure concentrations because RAIMI does not 
incorporate an exposure model.  In addition, the risk estimation within RAIMI is based on the 
assumption that individuals would be exposed to the same estimated exposure concentrations 
throughout their lifetime.  This is not realistic but it is very difficult, if not impossible, to predict 
                                                 
19 ISCST3 is a steady-state, multiple source, Gaussian dispersion model and has been the preferred regulatory model 
for industrial sources until it was replaced by AMS/EPA Regulatory Model (AERMOD) in 2005 (FR, 2005) 
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the lifetime exposures, which depend on the environment in which the individual will live in 
his/her entire lifetime. 
5.1.3 Other Data 
With regards to the other data, we adopt a value of $5.5 million (1999$) for VSL (V in 
the model).  This is the same value EPA used for its benefit cost assessment of the Clean Air Act 
(EPA, 1999a) for 1990-2010 (EPA used a mean VSL of $4.8 million in 1990$, which is $5.5 
million in 1999$).  The baseline emissions (Qbij in the decision model) represent current 
emissions according to the 1999 NTI for the sources and pollutants selected for the empirical 
analysis.  Values of unit risk factors, ju , for each of the six pollutants in the sample are obtained 
from EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System database.  The values used in the analysis are: 
0.0000078 for benzene, 0.0000022 for acetaldehyde, 0.000013 for formaldehyde, 0.000068 for 
acrylonitrile, 0.00024 for nickel, and 0.0043 for arsenic.  Finally, we obtain the population data 
from the US Census Bureau for the year 2000. 
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6.0 Results 
6.1 Emission Standards 
 Table 2 shows the estimated emission standards at three spatial resolutions under a MIR 
constraint of 100 in a million.  The emission standards do not change at the block group 
resolution compared to a coarser census tract resolution.  This is because regulation at block 
group resolution for our empirical setting does not capture any new hot spots.  The last column 
of Table 2 shows the emission standards at the finest (block) resolution.  Compared to regulation 
at coarser resolution, the emissions at this resolution are higher for a majority of sources and 
lower for some sources – resolution of regulation at the block level captured new hot spots that 
would not have been regulated at the coarser resolutions.  Table 3 shows the estimated emission 
standards under different resolutions of regulation at a more restrictive threshold cancer risk of 
10 in a million. 
 
[TABLE2 2 and 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
6.2 Spatial Distribution of Cancer Risk 
 We use these emission standards, Q*ij, to estimate cumulative excess individual cancer 
risk, rb, attributable to air toxics exposures at the centroid of each census block (b=1,2,…,B) in 
our two-county region for each spatial resolution of regulation.  By estimating risk at the 
centroid, we assume that each individual in the census block is exposed to that risk level.  We 
calculate the cancer risk with the following equation (the terms are defined as before): 
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 Figures 1 shows the spatial distribution of cancer risks when air toxics are regulated at 
the tract resolution with the threshold risk constraint of 100 in a million.  Figure 2 shows the 
spatial distribution at the block resolution regulation for the same threshold risk.  Figures 3 and 4 
show the spatial distribution of cancer risk for tract and block regulation, respectively, at the 10 
in a million risk threshold. 
 
[FIGURES 1 to 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
6.3 Environmental Justice Analysis 
 The first EJ measure we use is based on an interpretation of EJ by the EPA: 
“Environmental Justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people 
regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, 
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair 
treatment means that no group of people should bear a disproportionate share of the 
negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, governmental and 
commercial operations or policies.” (EPA, 2008) 
 Based on this interpretation, we assess the EJ implication of regulation at finer resolution 
by using the following measure: 
 
EJ Measure 1: No population group should be disproportionately exposed to hot spots. 
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 In this measure, the “negative environmental consequence” is the probability of an 
adverse health outcome, which in our case is the risk of cancer.  If one defines hot spots as the 
locations at which the risk of an adverse health outcome is above an acceptable threshold, as we 
have defined in this paper, then a comparison of Figure 1 and Figure 2 shows that the regulation 
at finer block resolution would eliminate the hot spots that would have resulted from a coarse 
regulation (the blocks in black in Figure 1 are no longer seen in Figure 2).  This holds true at the 
10 in a million threshold risk (Figures 3 and 4) as well.  The result is not surprising because at 
the block regulation, our decision model constrains the risk in each block to the acceptable 
threshold risk.  Thus, by this definition of EJ, under the regulation at finer spatial resolution, no 
group is disproportionately exposed to unacceptable risk levels. 
 The second measure we use is based on the “disproportionately adverse effect” definition 
developed by EPA in its EJ toolkit for staff. 
“….the term disproportionately high and adverse effects or impacts means an adverse 
effect or impact that: (1) is predominately borne by any segment of the population, 
including a minority population and/or a low-income population; or (2) will be suffered 
by a minority population and/or low-income population and is appreciably more severe or 
greater in magnitude than the adverse effect or impact that will be suffered by a non-
minority population and/or non-low-income population.” (EPA, 2004b, p: 71) 
 The toolkit also emphasizes that, to assess whether an EJ concern exists, the adverse 
impacts in the communities of concern should be compared to the impacts in reference 
communities.  In our interpretation of this guidance, a “community of concern” is any census 
block in which the proportion of minority population is higher than the proportion of minority 
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population in our study area as a whole.  The proportion of minorities in our study area is 22.4% 
and thus any block group that has a minority population share of more than 22.4% is a 
community of concern for our analysis.  To assess the EJ implications, we compare the mean 
individual cancer risk in communities of concern to the mean individual risk in all other 
communities.  Base on this classification, our EJ measure is: 
 
EJ Measure 2: On average, communities with a larger proportion of minorities than the 
region as a whole should not be exposed to greater individual cancer risks than the other 
communities. 
 Table 4 shows the results of our analysis.  At the tract resolution, the mean individual risk 
in the communities of concern is significantly higher than the mean risk in the reference 
communities.  This is the case for both the 100 in a million and 10 in a million risk thresholds.  If 
the regulation at finer resolution were to address the EJ concern, as defined by our measure, the 
difference in mean risk between the two communities should be statistically insignificant at the 
finer block resolution.  However, as the table 4 shows, that is not the case.  The mean individual 
cancer risk at the finer block resolution is statistically higher in the communities of concern at 
both the threshold risks.  Thus, the regulation at finer resolutions does not address the EJ 
concerns, as defined by this second measure. 
 Our third EJ measure is based on a population risk measure.  The previous two measures 
are based on individual risk, which represents the probability that an individual will develop a 
cancer when exposed to a certain concentration of air toxics.  The population risk is simply the 
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sum of individual risks in a population. For example, if a million people are exposed to a 1 in a 
million risk, the expected population risk is one case of cancer. 20 
 At any given resolution of regulation, we assess equity with respect to the population risk 
using the following measure: 
 
White, Non-white
i i
i
i
i i
i
CC CC
EJPOP i
POP POP
= =
∑
∑
 (10) 
Where    iCC  = Additional Expected Cancer Cases for Racial Group i 
   iPOP = Population of Racial Group i  
In a just world, each population group should have a value of one for this measure.  A 
value greater (less) than one indicates that the group bears a greater (lower) share of the expected 
cancer cases relative to the share of their population. 
 
[TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
EJ Measure 3: The share of expected additional cancer cases for minorities as a proportion of 
their share of total population should be equal to one. 
 Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the results of the analysis with respect to our population risk 
EJ measure.  Both figures show that at tract resolution as well as block resolution, the EJ 
                                                 
20 One can argue that the population risk is a more appropriate measure because it weights the risk by population.  
For example, if two census blocks are exposed to same individual risk but if one of the blocks has a much higher 
population than the other, the individual risk measure will not capture the fact that the overall risk is greater in the 
block with larger population. 
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measure is greater than one for nonwhites and less than one for whites.  As explained earlier, this 
result indicates that nonwhites would share a greater share of expected cancer cases relative to 
their share of population and this situation is not alleviated at a finer resolution regulation.  That 
is, if finer resolution regulation were to address EJ concerns, our EJ measure should reduce from 
greater than one at tract resolution to one at block resolution, which does not happen either at 
100 in a million threshold risk scenario or at the 10 in a million risk threshold scenario.  This 
suggests that the regulation at finer resolutions is unlikely to adequately address EJ concerns as 
defined by our third measure. 
 
[FIGURES 5 and 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
 
7.0 Discussion and Implications 
Regulation of air toxics at finely resolved spatial units has been emerging as an approach 
to deal with hot spots.  Given that addressing EJ concerns is one of the primary rationales for 
regulating hot spots, our goal in this paper was to analyze, ex ante, whether the policy of finer 
regulation of hot spots could address EJ concerns.  Based on the interpretation of various 
regulations and guidelines on EJ, we constructed three measures of EJ in order to evaluate the 
policy.  Our analysis suggests that increasing the resolution of regulation could change the 
spatial distribution of risk in such a way that the risk in hot spots (i.e., locations with risk levels 
beyond some acceptable level) is mitigated; the change in the distribution of risk might not, 
however, translate to a more equitable distribution of risk across racial groups.  In other words, 
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the policy of finer resolution regulation would be a protective regulatory policy but not a 
redistributive policy in a way that it addresses EJ concerns. 
It is possible to argue that our results are not necessarily generalizable across all 
situations and locations.  That is, it is conceivable that under some other empirical settings, 
spatially finer regulation would result in redistribution of risks in a way that addresses the EJ 
concerns, even within our modeled decision framework.  Such an outcome would, however, be a 
result of chance rather than design.  Even assuming that redistribution of risks in a way that 
equalizes risks across racial groups is the goal of EJ policies (which itself is not clear), the 
current decision process, as reflected by our model, incorporates only a general equity constraint 
and has no provision that explicitly addresses EJ goals.  This would, by design, ensure only a 
protective policy. 
Thus in order to guide future EJ policy, EPA and the other state agencies, in collaboration 
with the potentially affected EJ communities, should develop well-defined EJ goals and 
explicitly incorporate those goals into the decision process.  For example, if the goal is 
redistribution of risks from the EJ groups to the other groups, then such a goal could be 
incorporated into the decision process by specifying location-specific constraints.  One such 
location-specific constraint could be that locations, in which the percentage of the minorities 
exceeds the overall percentage of the minorities in the region, should be subjected to stricter risk 
threshold standard than other locations.  Such a constraint is easy to incorporate into the decision 
framework we modeled here.  The challenge, however, is to arrive at a basis for specifying the 
location-specific risk thresholds.  What should be the risk threshold for minority areas relative to 
other areas in the region?  This question gets complicated because of the lack of conclusive 
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evidence or guidance on the extent (quantitatively) to which EJ groups are more susceptible than 
other groups to exposure from air pollution (see Sexton, 1997 and Post et al., 2009 for a 
discussion). 
Another implication of our findings is that the assessment of EJ policy success could 
depend on the definition of EJ goals.  In the context of the policy we analyzed, if the goal is to 
ensure that the EJ communities are not exposed to adverse environmental impacts greater than 
some acceptable threshold levels, then the finer regulation policy meets that goal by design.  If 
the goal, however, is to redistribute risk such that the adverse impacts are equalized across 
groups, then the policy of finer resolution regulation may not help.  This suggests that agencies 
should develop clear metrics for measuring the effectiveness of EJ policies, in addition to 
specifying well-defined EJ goals. 
Future extensions to our paper can take several paths.  A potentially interesting path is to 
investigate the implications of our assumptions, in the decision model as well as empirical 
analysis, for the main findings.  First is the assumption that there is no variation in susceptibility 
to air toxics exposures across population groups.  It is straightforward to incorporate such a 
variation into our model and empirical analysis if concentration-response functions (cancer unit 
risk factors in the case of toxic air pollutants) can be specified differently for different population 
groups.  Such subgroup-specific risk factors are currently not available21, however (Sexton, 
1997; Post et al., 2009).  Second, due to limitations in the abatement cost data, we used the cost 
functions for an “average” firm in a given source category as a proxy for source-specific cost 
                                                 
21 The only exception with regards to cancer risk assessment is the case of children.  In its “Supplemental Guidance 
for Assessing Susceptibility from Early-Life Exposure to Carcinogens” the EPA recommends incorporating age 
dependent adjustment factors (ADAFs) in the dose-response relationships (EPA, 2005b).  For example, EPA 
recommends an ADAF of 10 for exposures before age 2 and an ADAF of 3 for exposures between the ages 2 and 
16. 
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functions.  Although source-specific functions are unlikely to significantly alter our main 
findings, future research could use the more accurate plant-specific cost functions, if available.   
Third, we assumed constant VSL across individuals.  Theoretical and empirical evidence 
in environmental economics indicates that VSL could vary with such factors as age, income, and 
baseline risk (Hammitt, 2000).  The evidence, however, does not appear conclusive (Krupnick, 
2007) and thus the current regulatory analysis continues to be based on constant VSL (EPA, 
2007).  In our case, we expect that a varying VSL will affect the risk distributions at coarse and 
finer regulation in a similar fashion.  Thus a varying VSL is unlikely to change our main findings 
significantly because our analysis is based on the differences in risk distribution between 
regulation at the coarse resolution and a finer resolution.  Again, it is straightforward to 
incorporate individual-specific VSL into our model and empirical analysis and we wish to 
incorporate such variations in future extensions. 
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 Table 1 Details of Cost Function Parameters Used in Empirical Analysis 
Facility Source Pollutants 
Emitted 
Cost Parameters 
ija  ijb  
IP Bleaching Line Vent Acetaldehyde 5303579 
(1230) 
-0.019 
(0.0001) 
Pulping System Vent Formaldehyde, 
Acetaldehyde, 
Benzene 
27600000 
(2.17e+06) 
-0.005 
(0.0013) 
GP  Boiler Formaldehyde, 
Acetaldehyde, 
Benzene 
755887 
(48729) 
-0.083 
(0.013) 
Boiler Formaldehyde, 
Acetaldehyde, 
Benzene 
755887 
(48729) 
-0.083 
(0.013) 
Boiler Formaldehyde, 
Acetaldehyde, 
Benzene 
755887 
(48729) 
-0.083 
(0.013) 
Boiler Nickel, 
Arsenic 
755887 
(48729) 
-0.083 
(0.013) 
SO Maelic Anhydride Plant 
Vent 
Formaldehyde, 
Acetaldehyde, 
Benzene 
1214368 
(551409) 
-0.066 
(0.013) 
AP Methylamine Plant Vent Formaldehyde, 
Acetaldehyde, 
Benzene 
1214368 
(551409) 
-0.066 
(0.013) 
SF Fugitive Emissions Acrylonitrile 25600000* -3.225* 
Fugitive Emissions Acrylonitrile 25600000* -3.225* 
Fugitive Emissions Acrylonitrile 25600000* -3.225* 
FG  Turbine Formaldehyde, 
Acetaldehyde, 
Benzene 
2248523* -6.307* 
SR Turbine Formaldehyde, 
Acetaldehyde, 
Benzene 
2248523* -6.307* 
Turbine Formaldehyde, 
Acetaldehyde, 
Benzene 
2248523* -6.307* 
TEG Reboiler Benzene 31863* -0.112* 
For cost parameters, numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors 
*Standard errors could not be estimated due to low sample size 
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Table 2 Emission Standards for Regulation at Various Spatial Resolutions (Threshold Risk = 
1.0E-04; VSL=$5.5 Million) 
 
Facility 
  
Pollutant 
  
Baseline 
Emissions 
(T/Y) 
  
Optimal Emissions (TPY) 
Tract Block 
Group 
Block 
IP Acetaldehyde 5.5 149.6 149.6 196.4 
Formaldehyde 8.5 0 0 0 
Acetaldehyde 50.9 135.1 135.1 69.3 
Benzene 5.08 0 0 0 
SO Formaldehyde 0.0436 1.57 1.57 7.87  
Acetaldehyde 0.00575 28.6 28.6  34.9 
Benzene 0.00052 9.35 9.35 15.6  
SF Acrylonitrile 2.819 0.11 0.11 0.03 
Acrylonitrile 5.48 0.28 0.28 0.21  
Acrylonitrile 1.159 0.17 0.17 0.07 
AP Formaldehyde 0.869 0 0  0 
Acetaldehyde 0.073 4.25 4.25  10.7  
Benzene 0.03 0 0 0 
SR Formaldehyde 30.52 1.02 1.02  1.07  
Acetaldehyde 2.561 1.30 1.30  1.35  
Benzene 1.0405 1.10 1.10  1.15  
Formaldehyde 0.01027 1.06 1.06  1.11  
Acetaldehyde 0.00135 1.34 1.34  1.39  
Benzene 0.000123 1.14 1.14  1.19 
Benzene 1.3 0 0 0 
FG Formaldehyde 78.8 1.15 1.15  1.20  
Acetaldehyde 6.615 1.43 1.43  1.48  
Benzene 2.687 1.23 1.23  1.28  
GP Formaldehyde 0.031 14.9 14.9  18.4  
Acetaldehyde 0.000006 36.3 36.3  39.8  
Benzene 0.00087 21.1 21.1  24.5  
Formaldehyde 0.00098 24.2 24.2  27.0  
Acetaldehyde 0.0000002 45.6 45.6  48.4  
Benzene 0.000028 30.4 30.4  33.1  
Formaldehyde 0.00228 37.8 37.8  40.2  
Acetaldehyde 0.0000004 59.2 59.2  61.6  
Benzene 0.0000621 44.0 44.0  46.4  
Nickel  0.4095 0 0 0 
Arsenic  0.438 0 0 0 
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Table 3 Emission Standards for Regulation at Various Spatial Resolutions (Threshold Risk = 
1.0E-05; VSL=$5.5 Million) 
 
Facility 
  
Pollutant 
  
Baseline 
Emissions 
(TPY) 
Optimal Emissions (TPY) 
   Census 
Tract 
Block 
Group 
Block 
IP Acetaldehyde 5.5 112.0 113.9  96.9 
Formaldehyde 8.5 0 0 0 
Acetaldehyde 50.9 0 0 0 
Benzene 5.08 0 0 0 
SO Formaldehyde 0.0436 0 0 0 
Acetaldehyde 0.00575 17.5 17.0  16.4  
Benzene 0.00052 0 0 0 
SF Acrylonitrile 2.819 0 0 0 
Acrylonitrile 5.48 0.06 0.06  0.03  
Acrylonitrile 1.159 0 0 0 
AP Formaldehyde 0.869 0 0 0 
Acetaldehyde 0.073 0 0 0.54 
Benzene 0.03 0 0 0 
SR Formaldehyde 30.52 0.90 0.90  0.86  
Acetaldehyde 2.561 1.2 1.19  1.14  
Benzene 1.0405 0.99 0.99  0.94  
Formaldehyde 0.01027 0.94 0.94  0.94  
Acetaldehyde 0.00135 1.22 1.22  1.22  
Benzene 0.000123 1.02 1.02  1.02  
Benzene 1.3 0 0 0 
FG Formaldehyde 78.8 1.03 1.03  1.06 
Acetaldehyde 6.615 1.31 1.31  1.35  
Benzene 2.687 1.11 1.11  1.14  
GP Formaldehyde 0.031 6.10 5.48  3.22  
Acetaldehyde 0.000006 27.5 26.9  24.6  
Benzene 0.00087 12.3 11.6  9.4  
Formaldehyde 0.00098 15.4 15.2  13.3 
Acetaldehyde 0.0000002 36.8 36.6  34.7  
Benzene 0.000028 21.6 21.4  19.5  
Formaldehyde 0.00228 29.0 29.1  27.4  
Acetaldehyde 0.0000004 50.4 50.5  48.8  
Benzene 0.0000621 35.2 35.2  33.5  
Nickel  0.4095 0 0 0 
Arsenic  0.438 0 0 0 
 
 
39 
 
Table 4 Mean Individual Cancer Risk in EJ and non-EJ communities 
 100 in a Million Threshold 10 in a Million Threshold 
Resolution of 
Regulation  
Mean Individual 
Risk in 
“communities of 
concern” 
Mean 
Individual Risk 
for all other 
communities 
Mean Individual 
Risk in 
“communities of 
concern” 
Mean 
Individual Risk 
for all other 
communities 
Census Tract 12.4 (n=2446) 9.6** (n = 4701) 4.8 (n=2446) 3.6** (n = 4701) 
Census Block 14.1 (n=2446) 10.7** (n = 4701) 4.1 (n=2446) 3.1** (n = 4701) 
** Difference in mean individual risk between communities of concern and other communities is significant at 1%; All cell 
values are “n in a million” units 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Figure 1 Spatial Distribution of Cancer Risks under Regulation at Census Tract Resolution (Cancer Risk 
Threshold of 100 in a Million) 
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Figure 2 Spatial Distribution of Cancer Risks under Regulation at Census Block Resolution (Cancer 
Risk Threshold of 100 in a Million) 
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 Figure 3 Spatial Distribution of Cancer Risks under Regulation at Census Tract Resolution (Cancer Risk 
Threshold of 10 in a Million) 
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Figure 4 Spatial Distribution of Cancer Risks under Regulation at Census Block Resolution (Cancer 
Risk Threshold of 10 in a Million) 
 Figure 5 Share of Expected Additional Annual Cancer Cases Relative to Share of Population at Tract and Block 
Resolution of Regulation for Whites and Nonwhites (Risk Threshold: 100 in a Million) 
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Figure 6 Share of Expected Additional Annual Cancer Cases Relative to Share of Population at Tract and Block 
Resolution of Regulation for Whites and Nonwhites (Risk Threshold: 10 in a Million) 
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